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NOTES
THE RELEASE PROVISION OF THE UNIFORM
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORT-FEASORS ACT
APPLIES TO VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE MASTER-
SERVANT CONTEXT- Yates v. New South Pizza, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Employers can be held liable for the injuries inflicted on
others by their employees.' Sometimes, the employee is at fault
while the employer is not.2 The law broadens the liability for this
fault by imposing liability upon the employer under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.3 Yet, when a release or a covenant not to sue
is executed between the employee and an injured third party the
question arises whether the release of any claim against the em-
ployee releases the claim against the employer.4
In Yates v. New South Pizza, Ltd.,5 the North Carolina Su-
preme Court held that the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act' applies to master-servant vicarious liability.7 Upon the
1. CHARLES E. DAYE & MARK W. MORRIS, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 385
(1991).
2. Id.
3. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69
(5th ed. 1984).
4. Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Release of, or Covenant Not to Sue, One
Primarily Liable for Tort, but Expressly Reserving Rights Against One Seconda-
rily Liable, As Bar to Recovery Against Latter, 24 A.L.R.4th 547 (1983) [herein-
after Annotation, Release-Secondary Liability].
5. 330 N.C. 790, 412 S.E.2d 666 (1992).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-1 to -6 (1983). The Uniform Contribution Among
Tort-feasors Act, originally promulgated in 1939 by the National Conference of
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, was revised in 1955. North Carolina
adopted the 1955 version in 1967. 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 847 §1. Yates v. New
South Pizza, Ltd., 330 N.C. 790, 792, 412 S.E.2d 666, 668 (1992).
7. Yates v. New South Pizza, Ltd., 330 N.C. 790, 412 S.E.2d 666 (1992).
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facts of this case, the Court held that the covenant not to sue the
employee which expressly reserves the right to sue the employer
does not release the defendant-employer from liability.8
This Note will examine the court's decision in Yates v. New
South Pizza. The Note will first address the facts of the case. Sec-
ond, this Note will discuss the doctrines that affect the decision of
the case. Third, this Note will discuss the enactment and purpose
of the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act.' Fourth, this
Note will analyze the Yates decision and its effect on the purpose
of the Uniform Act. Fifth, this Note will explore the public policy
behind the courts' ruling. Finally, this Note concludes that the
Yates decision supports the equitable doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior by providing additional protection for injured plaintiffs from
harsh common law rules while seeking compensation from an em-
ployee as well as the vicariously liable employer.
THE CASE
On September 5, 1985, Donald Lee Powell, a delivery person
for New South Pizza,' 0 ran a stop sign and collided with another
car." The injured plaintiff, Anthony Gene Yates, was a passenger
in the other car. 12 The plaintiff suffered injuries to his head, right
wrist and permanent damage to his left hip. 3 On August 26, 1987,
the plaintiff executed a covenant not to sue Powell or his insurer in
exchange for $25,000. "' The $25,000 consideration represented the
full amount of coverage under Powell's insurance policy.' 5 The cov-
enant expressly reserved the right of the plaintiff to proceed
against the employer.'"
8. Id.
9. Within the Note the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act
promulgated by the National Conference of Commissions on Uniform State Laws
will hereinafter be referred to as the "Uniform Act". The North Carolina statute
by the same name will hereinafter be referred to as "the Act".
10. New South Pizza, Ltd., d/b/a Domino's Pizza. Yates, 330 N.C. at 791, 412
S.E.2d at 667.
11. Yates v. New South Pizza, Ltd., 330 N.C. 790, 791, 412 S.E.2d 666, 667
(1992).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Yates, 330 N.C. at 791, 412 S.E.2d at 667. The covenant not to sue reads
in relevant part:
It is understood that [plaintiff] contends there are joint tort-feasors
[Vol. 15:55
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In August 1988, the plaintiff instituted a claim against the em-
ployer, New South Pizza.17 At the trial, the defendant employer
denied Powell was negligent, but admitted Powell, as an employee,
was acting within the scope of his employment."8 Additionally,
New South Pizza argued that the settlement between the plaintiff
and Powell operated to release the defendant from liability as a
matter of law. 9 The defendant was granted a motion for summary
judgment.20 The Court of Appeals affirmed by concluding that
under the doctrine of respondeat superior the covenant not to sue
released any claim against the defendant. 21
The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed, agreeing with
the plaintiff that section 1B-4 of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tort-feasors Act would apply to vicariously derived liability. 22
BACKGROUND
A. Respondeat Superior
1. General Common Law Doctrine
The doctrine of respondeat superior23 means that when an
employee negligently injures a third party the act of the employee
becomes the negligent act of the employer. 24 Liability is imposed
in this matter; to wit, Donald Lee Powell and Domino's Pizza, Inc., said
joint tort-feasors relationship arising out of the servant-master relation-
ships and [plaintiff] expressly reserves and maintains his right to pursue
any and all claims against Domino's Pizza, Inc. arising out of the incident
and that [plaintiff] agrees only not to sue Donald Lee Powell and INA/
Action, his vehicular insurance carrier. Id.
17. Yates v. New South Pizza, Ltd., 102 N.C. App. 66, 66, 401 S.E.2d 380, 381
(1991) rev'd, 330 N.C. 790, 412 S.E.2d 666 (1992).
18. Yates v. New South Pizza, Ltd., 330 N.C. 790, 791, 412 S.E.2d 666, 668
(1992).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Yates, 102 N.C. App. 66, 401 S.E.2d 380 (1991) rev'd, 330 N.C. 790, 412
S.E.2d 666 (1992) (Court of Appeals held that when there is a right of indemnity
from another tort-feasor, the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1B-1 to -6 does not apply); Yates v. New South Pizza, Ltd., 330 N.C.
790, 792, 412 S.E.2d 666, 668 (1992).
22. Yates, 330 N.C. at 792-93, 412 S.E.2d at 668.
23. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, at 500. This Latin phrase means nothing
more than "look to the man higher up." Id.
24. 53 AM. JUR. 2d Master and Servant § 417 (1970). "The employer is
deemed to be constructively present; the act of the employee is his act, and he
becomes accountable as for his own proper act or omission." Id.
1992]
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upon the employer for acts his employees commit within the scope
of their employment. 25 This doctrine is based upon equitable prin-
ciples; the goal being to make the injured plaintiff whole. 26 A vari-
ety of justifications exist which support the common law rationale
behind the vicarious liability of the employer.27 The modern policy
justification for vicarious liability is predicated upon a theory of
allocation of the risks attendant upon the operation of any enter-
prise.28 The loss caused by the torts of employees is viewed as a
required cost of doing business. 29 These costs are perceived to be
more easily absorbed and assimilated through the business arena
than by individuals and the commercial enterprise system is seen
as having a better opportunity to disseminate these costs of doing
business throughout society while still able to maintain the eco-
nomic livelihood of its members.
2. North Carolina Common Law
The doctrine of respondeat superior in North Carolina arises
out of the relation between master and servant.3" The act of the
employee that injures a third party is frequently perceived by law
as the act of the employer." The general rule in North Carolina is
25. Id. "The law imputes to the master the act of the servant, and if the act
is negligent or wrongful, proximately resulting in injury to a third person, the
negligence or wrongful conduct is the negligence or wrongful conduct of the
master, for which he is liable." Id.
26. Id.
27. KEETON ET AL., supra note 3 at 500. A variety of reasons are offered for
imposing liability upon the master, including: a fictitious control over the behav-
ior of the servant, that the master has set the whole thing in motion and is there-
fore responsible for what happens, the master selected the servant and thus
should suffer for his wrongs rather than an innocent stranger or, more frankly and
cynically, "In hard fact, the reason for the employers' liability is the damages are
taken from a deep pocket." Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. "They are placed upon the employer because, having engaged in an
enterprise, which will on the basis of all past experience involve harm to others
through the torts of employees, and sought to profit by it, it is just that he, rather
than the innocent injured plaintiff, should bear them; and because he is better
able to absorb them, and to distribute them, through prices, rates or liability in-
surance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the community at large."
Id.
30. Smith v. South & W. R. Co., 151 N.C. 479, 482, 66 S.E. 435, 437 (1909)
abrogated by, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-4 (1967); See Yates v. New South Pizza, Ltd.,
330 N.C. 790, 412 S.E.2d 666 (1992).
31. Id. "The principle upon which a master is in general liable to answer for
4
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that "[iliability exists as against the master for wrongful or negli-
gent acts of his servant only when the agent is acting within the
scope of his employment and is about his master's business, at-
tempting to do what he was employed to do."32 Thus, if these con-
ditions exist, compensation for an injury caused by an employee
can be found by looking to the supervising entity or enterprise.
B. The Release33 and Covenant not to Sue
3 4
1. Common Law
The early rule provided that a release of one joint tort-feasor
served to release all joint tort-feasors3 5 This theory was based
upon the idea that a release involves an abandonment or extin-
guishment of a claim.38 Where the release contained an express
reservation of the right to make a claim against another tort-fea-
sor, that reservation was seen as having no effect.37 The covenant
not to sue, on the other hand, did not abandon or extinguish liabil-
ity, but merely was an agreement not to sue on the claim."8 Thus, a
covenant not to sue one joint tort-feasor did not discharge the
other tort-feasors3 9 It is accordingly clear that at common law it
was critical to acknowledge the distinction between these two ac-
tions and it was incumbent upon the plaintiff who wished to utilize
either of these measures to carefully consider the ramifications of
his act.
2. Vicarious Liability
In cases dealing with vicarious liability, the courts are not in
accord with regard to whether a release or covenant not to sue con-
accidents resulting from the negligence or unskillfulness of his servant is that the
act of his servant is in truth his own act." Id.
32. Snow v. De Butts, 212 N.C 120, 123, 193 S.E. 224, 226 (1937).
33. A release is defined as "[g]iving up or abandoning of claim or right to
person against whom claim exists or against whom right is to be exercised."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1159 (5th ed. 1979).
34. A covenant not to sue is defined as "[a] covenant by one who had a right
of action at the time of making it against another person, by which he agrees not
to sue to enforce such right of action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 329 (5th ed.).
35. 66 AM. JUR. 2d Release § 37 (1973); see also, Annotation, Release-Second-
ary Liability, supra note 4.
36. Annotation, Release-Secondary Liability, supra note 4, at 551.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 66 AM JUR. 2d Release § 37 (1973).
1992]
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taining an express reservation of rights against one who is vicari-
ously liable will bar recovery against that party.4" The majority of
cases dealing with a release hold that such a release will bar recov-
ery despite the express reservation of rights against the tort-feasor
held vicariously liable."' These cases adhere to the common law
rule that a release of one tort-feasor releases all."2 However, there
are a few cases which have held that the release did not discharge
the claim against the vicariously liable tort-feasor. 3
Courts dealing with a covenant not to sue have similarly dis-
charged a claim against a tort-feasor alleged to have been vicari-
ously liable, even in the presence of an express reservation by the
injured plaintiff of his right to proceed against the vicariously lia-
ble tort-feasor." Conversely, other courts have ruled that a claim
may proceed against one vicariously liable when the covenant not
to sue expressly reserves that right."5 It is thus apparent that
40. Id.
41. Dickey v. Estate of Meier, 197 N.W.2d 385 (Neb. 1972) (derivative claims
against an employer based on respondeat superior were discharged by a settle-
ment release of a negligent driver); Jacobson v. Parrill, 351 P.2d 194 (Kan. 1960)
(release of a negligent agent discharged the principal's liability despite a reserva-
tion of rights against the principal in wrongful death claim from automobile acci-
dent); Barsh v. Mullins, 338 P.2d 845 (Okla. 1959) (despite the express reserva-
tion of rights the release of a tort-feasor directly involved in an accident released
the liability of a common carrier derivatively liable).
42. Annotation, Release-Secondary Liability, supra note 4, § 3[a], at 557.
43. Driskill v. State, 787 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. 1990). "As a general rule, a settle-
ment with a release of employee does not bar subsequent action against employer
undei doctrine of respondeat superior for any damages that have not been fully
satisfied." 787 S.W.2d at 370. Swanigan v. State Farm Ins. Co., 299 N.W.2d 234
(Wis. 1980) (release by injured party of tort-feasor primarily liable did not dis-
charge liability of party secondarily liable reasoning the release should be given
the effect intended by the parties); see also, Annotation, Release-Secondary Lia-
bility, supra note 4, § 3[b], at 558.
44. Stewart v. Craig, 344 S.W.2d 761 (1961) (derivative liability of a master
or principal is extinguished by a covenant not to sue the servant or agent); Simp-
son v. Townsley, 283 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1960) (covenant not to sue an employee
removed the basis to impute employee's negligence upon employer under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior and discharged employers liability despite reserved
rights against employer); see also, Annotation, Release-Secondary Liability supra
note 4, § 4[a], at 559.
45. Boucher v. Thomsen, 43 N.W.2d 866 (1950) (held the express language of
the covenant not to sue left no question as to what the parties intended); Hovat-
ter v. Shell Oil Co., 529 P.2d 224 (1974) (adopied the rule of Restatement of Torts
2d § 885 and held that a covenant not to sue a primarily liable servant expressly
reserving rights against the master does not discharge the claim against the
[Vol. 15:55
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courts throughout the United States are not yet in full accord with
regard to the effect of either a release or a convenant not to sue
upon potential recovery from one who is alleged to be vicariously
liable for injuries to a plaintiff who executes such an agreement.
3. North Carolina Common Law
The common law rule in North Carolina maintains that the
release of one joint tort-feasor releases all other joint tort-feasors.",
The reason stated is that the injured plaintiff is entitled to but one
satisfaction and the cause of action is indivisible between the tort-
feasors for the same injury."' Thus, the release operates to extin-
guish the cause of action, thereby releasing the other joint tort-
feasors."
In the case of vicarious liability, although a master and a ser-
vant are not strictly deemed as being joint tort-feasors, a release of
either master or servant from liability for a tort does operate to
release the other.49 The rationale of the common law rule stated by
the North Carolina Supreme Court is that the principle invoked to
impose liability should also be invoked for protection.5
On the other hand, the covenant not to sue does not release
other tort-feasors from liability.51 A cause of action can be main-
tained against any of the other tort-feasors who are not a party to
the agreement. 52 The remaining tort-feasors are, however, entitled
to have any amounts paid for the covenant by the party to the
agreement credited against any judgment the plaintiff may obtain
master); see also, Annotation, Release-Secondary Liability, supra note 4, § 4[b],
at 561.
46. MacFarlane v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm., 244 N.C. 385,
387, 93 S.E.2d 557, 560 (1956).
47. McNair v. Goodwin, 262 N.C. 1, 3, 136 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1964).
48. Id.
49. Brown v. Louisburg, 126 N.C. 701, 36 S.E. 166 (1900).
50. Smith v. South & W. R. Co., 151 N.C. 479, 482, 66 S.E. 435, 437 (1909)
abrogated, see supra note 30. "If the master is bound through his agent, can he
not be released through his agent? If an act of negligence imposes liability, ought
nbt an act of fidelity bring relief? This would seem to be obvious except in those
cases where the master actively participates in the wrong and thereby makes him-
self a joint tort-feasor." Id.
51. Simpson v. Plyler, 258 N.C. 390, 128 S.E.2d 843 (1963). A covenant not to
sue "is not a present abandonment or relinquishment of the right or claim, but
merely an agreement not to enforce an existing cause of action." Id at 394, 128
S.E.2d at 846.
52. Id; McNair v. Goodwin, 262 N.C. 1, 3, 136 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1964).
1992]
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against them.5
It is therefore clear that previous common law made a signifi-
cant distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue.54 A
plaintiff who desired to settle with one tort-feasor while maintain-
ing rights against other tort-feasors would properly execute a cove-
nant not to sue with that party, as opposed to a release.55 This
distinction had the distinct potential to operate as a trap for the
unwary.56
C. The Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act
1. Prior Law
Prior to the adoption of the Act in North Carolina, the com-
mon law did not recognize the right to compel contribution57
among tort-feasors.58 In 1919, the common law rule changed and
eventually was codified as N.C.G.S. § 1-240.' 9 This former statute
provided that where two or more persons were liable for their joint
tort and judgment was rendered against some, but not all such per-
sons, those that paid were entitled to enforce contribution against
the others jointly liable.8 0 Thus, the right to contribution in North
53. Ramsey v. Camp, 254 N.C. 443, 444-45, 119 S.E.2d 209, 211 (1961).
54. Ottinger v. Chronister, 13 N.C. App. 91, 185 S.E.2d 292 (1971). "[Tlhe
distinction between a covenant not to sue and a release is critical." Id at 94, 185
S.E.2d at 294.
55. Recent Development, 47 N.C.L. Rev. 275 (1968).
56. 66 AM. JUR. 2d Release § 36 (1973); see also, Simpson v. Pyler, 258 N.C.
390, 128 S.E.2d 843 (1963) (covenant not to sue operated to release other tort-
feasors because the agreement, judgment and satisfaction of judgment constituted
a release). "The critical question, in determining whether an instrument is a re-
lease or a covenant not to sue, is whether the cause of action has been extin-
guished. The cause of action is single, indivisible and non-apportionable. Once it
is extinguished it has no further vitality." Id at 395, 128 S.E.2d at 846-47; see also
McNair v. Goodwin, 262 N.C. 1, 136 S.E.2d 218 (1964); Ottinger v. Chronister, 13
N.C. App. 91, 185 S.E.2d 292 (1971).
57. Contribution is defined as the principle under which "a tort-feasor
against whom a judgment is rendered is entitled to recover proportional shares of
judgment from other joint tort-feasors whose negligence contributed to the injury
and who were also liable to the plaintiff." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 297 (5th ed.
1979).
58. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bynum, 267 N.C. 289, 291, 148
S.E.2d 114, 116 (1966).
59. Id. In 1919, North Carolina enacted Chapter 194, .hich was changed by
Chapter 68, Public Laws of 1929. These enactments were codified as N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-240 (1953) (repealed 1967). Id.
60. Id.
[Vol. 15:55
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Carolina is dependent upon the terms of the statute. 1 The right to
contribution was enforceable two ways: a party sued could have
other tort-feasors made parties, or a party could wait until a judg-
ment was rendered against him and then maintain an action
against the other tort-feasors 2 In adherence to the logic underly-
ing the crafting of these alternatives, a joint tort-feasor against
whom contribution was sought could use the other tort-feasors'
prior executed release as a defense.6 3
2. The Act in North Carolina
The Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act, first
promulgated in 1939, and revised in 1955,4 establishes the right of
a person liable for damages "to compel others, who are liable with
him for the same damages, to share in discharging the common
liability."65 The purpose of the Act is to "distribute the burden of
responsibility equitably among those who are jointly liable and
thus avoid the injustice often resulting under the common law."66
In 1967, the North Carolina General Assembly adopted the 1955
version of the Act. 7 The North Carolina Supreme Court has stated
that, in part, the policy of the statute is to encourage settlements. 8
Section 1B-4 of the Act addresses the technical distinction be-
tween the release and the covenant not to sue. 9 The Act abolishes
61, Godfrey v. Tidewater Power Co., 223 N.C. 647, 27 S.E.2d 736 (1943)
(under the statute the right accrues when judgment is obtained in an action aris-
ing out of a joint tort); Bell v. Lacey, 248 N.C. 703, 104 S.E.2d 833 (1958) (right of
contribution between joint tort-feasors who are in pari delicto did not exist at
common law but is purely statutory).
62. Pearsall v. Duke Power Co., 258 N.C. 639, 642-43, 129 S.E.2d 217, 219
(1963).
63. McNair v. Goodwin, 262 N.C. 1, 136 S.E.2d 218 (1964) (release may be
pleaded by joint tort-feasor as a bar to suit by other where subject matter of
release is all damages growing out of collision between two automobiles).
64. 12 U.L.A. 57 (1975).
65. Commissioners' Prefatory Note (1955 Revision) 12 U.L.A.. 59 (1975).
66. Id.
67. 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws 847, codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-4 to -6 (1967).
68. Wheeler v. Denton, 9 N.C. App. 167, 171, 175 S.E.2d 769, 772 (1970).
"The statute contemplates that settlements are to be encouraged. (citation omit-
ted). It is also desirable that settlements be made promptly and with finality." Id.
69. Section 1B-4 provides:
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment
is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the
same injury or the same wrongful death:
(1) It does not discharge any of the other tort-feasors from liability
1992]
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the distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue. 0 The
question of whether this section of the Act applies to vicarious lia-
bility in the master-servant context was, nonetheless, a question of
first impression for the North Carolina Supreme Court.7'
ANALYSIS
In Yates v. New South Pizza, Ltd., the North Carolina Su-
preme Court held that section 1B-4 of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tort-feasors Act does apply to vicarious liability in the
master-servant context.72 The issue before the Court in Yates was
"whether an injured plaintiff is entitled to proceed against an em-
ployer on the theory of respondeat superior after having executed,
for valuable consideration, a covenant.not to sue the negligent em-
ployee or his insurer."7 " The Yates majority held that such a plain-
tiff may proceed.74 The Court states it is in agreement with other
courts which have held that Section 4 of the Uniform Act applies
to vicariously derived liability.7 5 Additionally, the court believes
the Act broadens the definition of tort-feasor to encompass a vicar-
iously liable master.7 The Court rejects the holding by the Court
of Appeals that when there is a right to indemnity from another
tort-feasor the Act does not control."
for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it
reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipu-
lated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the considera-
tion paid for it, whichever is the greater; and,
(2) It discharges the tort-feasor to whom it is given from all liability
for contribution to any other tort-feasor.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-4 (1967).
70. Ottinger v. Chronister, 13 N.C. App. 91, 94, 185 S.E.2d 292, 294 (1971).
The 1939 Act dealt only with release. The 1955 version added the covenant not to
sue or not to levy execution because it should obviously have the same effect.
Commissioners' Comment, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975).
71. Yates v. New South Pizza, Ltd., 330 N.C. 790, 792, 412 S.E.2d 666, 668
(1992).
72. Id. at 793, 412 S.E.2d at 668.
73. Id. at 791, 412 S.E.2d at 667-68.
74. Id.
75. Yates, 330 N.C. at 791, 412 S.E.2d at 667-68; see Alaska Airlines v. Sweat,
568 P.2d 916 (1977); Brady v. Prarie Material Sales, Inc., 190 Ill. App. 3d 571, 546
N.E.2d 802 (2d Dist. 1989), appeal denied, 129 Ill. 2d 561, 550 N.E.2d 553 (1990);
Van Cleave v. Gamboni Constr. Co., 101 Nev. 524, 706 P.2d 845 (1985).
76. Yates, 330 N.C. at 793-94, 412 S.E.2d at 669.
77. Id. at 795, 412 S.E.2d at 670.
[Vol. 15:55
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A. Other jurisdictions
There are twenty-one other states that have adopted either
the 1939 or 1955 version of the Uniform Act.78 States that apply
Section 4 to vicarious liability base their holdings on three ratio-
nales: (1) that the Uniform Act proffers a broad definition of tort-
feasor, (2) that the purpose of the Uniform Act is to encourage
settlements, and (3) that to apply Section 4 of the Uniform Act
would most effectively uphold the intent of the parties to the re-
lease. 79 Those states that decline to extend the Uniform Act to vi-
carious liability narrowly construe the definition of tort-feasor and
hold that the indemnity provision of the Uniform Act precludes its
application to principal-agent relationships.8"
In the Yates decision the Court interprets Section 4 of the
Uniform Act as being applicable to vicariously liable tort-feasors.8 '
The Yates court states that the holding is based on two rationales,
a broad definition of tort-feasor and the stated public policy that
encourages settlement.8 2 North Carolina is in accord with Alaska,
Nevada and Illinois, which also interpret the 1955 revision to in-
clude vicariously derived liability.8"
1. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Sweat 4
In Sweat, the plaintiff was injured in an airplane crash caused
by pilot error.85 The plane that crashed was an air taxi under con-
tract with Alaska Airlines, Inc., who was held vicariously liable as a
common carrier.86 The air taxi and Sweat entered into a covenant
not to sue specifically stating the settlement did not include a re-
lease of Alaska Airlines.8
The Alaska Supreme Court had previously rejected the harsh
78. Arizona, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Caro-
lina, South Dakota, and Tennessee. U.L.A. Directory of Acts '91 Pamph.
79. supra note 76.
80. See Craven v. Lawson, 534 S.W.2d 653 (Tenn. 1976); Mamalis v. Atlas
- Van Lines,'Inc., 522 Pa. 214, 560 A.2d 1380 (1989) (interpreting 1939 Act).
81. Yates, 330 N.C. at 793, 412 S.E.2d at 669.
82. Yates, 330 N.C. at 795-96, 412 S.E.2d at 670.
83. supra note 75.
84. 568 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1977).
85. Alaska Airlines v. Sweat, 568 P.2d 916, 921 (Alaska 1977).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 923.
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common law rule whereby the release of one joint tort-feasor re-
leased all in Young v. State, holding that a joint tort-feasor is not
released unless specifically named in that release.8 The Alaska Su-
preme Court stated that "this rule will insure that the intent of the
parties to the release is given effect and will greatly minimize the
possibility of any party being misled as to the effect of the re-
lease."8 9 The rationale of Young was held to further apply to situa-
tions involving vicarious liability, and in so holding, advanced the
applicability of the Alaska Uniform Joint Tort-feasors Act.90 The
Sweat court noted that "[ilt may be that Alaska Airlines is not
technically a 'tort-feasor', but it is 'one of two or more liable in tort
for the same injury'."9' 1 The court further held that the policy
favoring termination of litigation and encouraging settlements
should prevail.92
The Yates majority is in accord with the Alaska Supreme
Court in holding that the plain language of the Uniform Act "is
intended to include those vicariously liable. '9 3 But in Sweat the
common law rule that insured that the intent of the parties to the
release would be given effect would be supported by a reading of a
broad definition of tort-feasor. 4 Although not specifically using an
"intent of the parties" rationale, the Yates majority does note that
Section 1B-4 provides that a release given in "good faith" does not
discharge any of the other tort-feasors from liability. 5 In Yates the
"good faith" requirement within Section 1B-4 of the Act supports
a broad definition of tort-feasor and will, in effect, support the in-
tent of the parties by applying the Act to situations involving
master-servant vicariously liability.96
88. Young v. State, 455 P.2d 889 (Alaska 1969).
89. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Sweat, 568 P.2d 916, 929 (1977).
90. Sweat, 568 P.2d at 929. Alaska Uniform Contribution among Tort-feasors
Act, ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.010 to 09.16.060 (1970). § 09.16.040(1) is section 4 from
the Uniform Act and is worded exactly the same as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-4(1)).
Id.
91. Sweat, 568 P.2d at 930.
92. Id.
93. Yates, 330 N.C. at 795, 412 S.E.2d at 669.
94. Sweat, 568 P.2d at 929.
95. Yates, 330 N.C. at 794-95, 412 S.E.2d at 669-70.
96. Id.
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2. Van Cleave v. Gamboni Construction Company"
The facts of Van Cleave, similar to Yates, involve an automo-
bile accident, and again the issue of vicarious liability arises under
the doctrine of respondeat superior.98 In Van Cleave, the plaintiff
was rendered a paraplegic by a one-car accident.9 9 The plaintiff
was a passenger in the car operated by an employee of Gamboni
Construction Company acting within the scope of his employ-
ment.1"' The plaintiff settled with the employee through the use of
a release which expressly reserved the plaintiff's claims against
"any other parties". 101 The Van Cleave court held that because
both the employee and employer were liable for the injury, their
version of the Uniform Act would apply. 2 The court further rec-
ognized that the expressed public policy of the Uniform Act is to
encourage settlement.103
3. Brady v. Prarie Material Sales, Inc.10 4
The Court in Yates finds support in an Illinois decision which
supports the proposititon that "the liability of the master, al-
though derivative, is still a form of liability in tort as that term is
used in the [Uniform] Act. 10 8 The facts of Brady indicate that
while in the scope of his employment, the defendant's employee
lost control of his truck and crashed into a building, permanently
injuring the plaintiff.' 6 The plaintiff settled with the employee
and his insurance company while generally reserving all other
97. 101 Nev. 524, 706 P.2d 845 (1985).
98. Van Cleave v. Gamboni Constr. Co., 101 Nev. 524, 525-26, 706 P.2d 845,
846 (1985).
99. Id. at 525, 706 P.2d at 846.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Van Cleave, 101 Nev. at 528, 706 P.2d at 848: "We... hold that because
the employer Gamboni, and its employee, Alimsis are both allegedly liable for
Van Cleave's injury, the Uniform Act applies." Id.
103. Van Cleave, 101 Nev. at 530, 706 P.2d at 849. "We recognize that the
expressed public policy established by the Uniform Act is 'to encourage rather
than discourage settlements.' " Id.
104. 190 Ill. App. 3d 571, 546 N.E.2d 802 (2d Dist. 1989), appeal denied, 129
Ill. 2d 561, 550 N.E.2d 553 (1990).
105. Yates, 330 N.C. at 793, 412 S.E.2d at 668.
106. Brady v. Prarie Material Sales, Inc., 190 Ill. App. 3d 571, 573, 546
N.E.2d 802, 804 (2nd Dist. 1989) appeal denied, 129 Ill. 2d 561, 550 N.E.2d 553
(1990).
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claims. 10 7 The common law rule in Illinois had been that a release
or covenant not to sue was required to specifically reserve the right
to sue others. °' However, the court in this case held that the un-
qualified general release did not release the employer under the
Uniform Act.109
B. Definition of "Tort-feasor"
In Yates, the Court states that "for purposes of this act,.a
tort-feasor is one who is liable in tort.' 10 The court relies on the
language of the definition of joint tort-feasor contained in the 1939
version of the Uniform Act.1 The Court's analysis of the Uniform
Act states that the 1939 Act defined joint tort-feasor broadly. 2
The term joint tort-feasors means "two-or more persons jointly or
severally liable in tort for the same injury." 1 " Other courts that
have interpreted the 1939 version have had no trouble interpreting
this language, to include master-servant vicarious liability.1 4 It is
thus apparent that the court in Yates broadly construed the lan-
guage of the Act, and in so doing, included the master-servant
relationship.15
This holding is in line with the well reasoned decisions of
other courts." 6 In Sweat, the Alaska court, citing Smith v.
Rapaport, concludes that the language "one of two or more per-
sons liable in tort for the same injury ... seems to include a party
who is vicariously liable."' 17 In Sweat, the court construed the
1955 revision of the Uniform Act which does not have a definition
of tort-feasor.1 8 Yet the Court finds the 1955 revision uses the
107. Id. at 574, 546 N.E.2d at 804-806.
108. Id. at 575, 546 N.E.2d at 804.
109. Id. at 583-84, 546 N.E.2d at 810.
110. Yates, 330 N.C. at 794, 412 S.E.2d at 669.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (emphasis in original).
114. See Holve v. Draper, 505 P.2d 1265, (Idaho 1973) (held that joint tort-
feasors had a broad meaning and would include the master-servant relationship
within the purpose of the Uniform Act); Smith v. Raparot, 225 A.2d 666 (R.I.
1967) (held that the 1939 Act applied to the vicarious liability of the master-
servant because they become jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff upon the
occurrence of the tort).
115. Yates, 330 N.C. at 794, 412 S.E.2d at 669.
116. supra note 76.
117. Sweat, 568 P.2d at 929.
118. Id.
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word tort-feasor in the same context as it is used in the 1939
version.' 9
In Yates, the North Carolina Court similarly believes the 1955
Uniform Act is consistent with this broad definition, even though
the definition was omitted from the later version -of the Uniform
Act.' 0 The Yates majority points out that the language, "two or
more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same
injury," in section 1B-1(a) of the Act is essentially the same lan-
guage of its predecessor, Section 1B-4.121 The Yates court states:
"Clearly, both the master and the servant are persons liable in tort
for the same injury, and tort-feasors as used in this provision refers
to those persons liable in tort.""'2 Thus, the Yates majority relies
on the plain language of the Act to determine that a master is a
tort-feasor under section 1B-4.' 3
Those courts that deny that the Uniform Act applies to
master-servant relationships construe the statute to intend a nar-
row construction of the term tort-feasor.124 Similarly, the Yates
dissent narrowly defines "tort-feasor" as a wrongdoer who commits
or is guilty of a tort.' 5 These joint tort-feasors "are those who act
together in committing a wrong, or whose acts, if independent of
each other, unite in causing a single injury."'2 6 The dissent claims
the majority's conclusion that an employer derivatively liable is a
tort-feasor "blurs the significant distinction between vicarious and
joint liability.' 2 7 However, the term "joint tort-feasor" was not in-
cluded in the 1955 revision in order to avoid confusion in those
jurisdictions where persons who act independently and not in con-
cert cannot always be joined as defendants. 12" Therefore, the term
119. Sweat, 568 P.2d at 930.
120. Yates, 330 N.C. at 794, 412 S.E.2d at 669.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Supra note 81.
125. Yates, 330 N.C. at 796, 412 S.E.2d at 670.
126. Yates v. New South Pizza, Ltd., 330 N.C. 790, 797, 412 S.E.2d 666, 671
(1992) (quoting White v. Keller, 242 N.C. 97, 100, 86 S.E.2d 795, 797 (1955)).
127. Yates, 330 N.C. at 803, 412 S.E.2d at 674.
128. Commissioners' Comment § 1(a) 12 U.L.A. 64 (1975). "In these jurisdic-
tions the tendency is to use 'joint tort-feasors' to refer only to those who can be
joined. The term is not indispensable to the Act .... Id. See also, T. Merritt
Bumpass, Jr., Comment, North Carolina Legislation: An Act Providing for Con-
tribution Among Joint Tort-feasors and Joint Obligors, 5 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
160 (1968).
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"joint tort-feasor" is not indispensable to the Uniform Act and is
excluded to promote the purpose of the Uniform Act.129 Otherwise,
the effect of a narrow interpretation of tort-feasor is to narrowly
construe the statute and would once again require the principles of
common law to control in these situations.130 This result is in di-
rect opposition to the stated purposes of the Uniform Act.3
C. The Purpose of the Uniform Act
The policy of the Uniform Act is to encourage settlements.1 32
The Act intends to distribute the burden of responsibility equita-
bly among those who are jointly liable and thus avoid the injustice
often resulting under the common law. 33 The harshness of the
common law rule is illustrated in the highly technical process of
interpreting a release or a covenant not to sue. 3 In furtherance of
this policy, the objective of Section 4 is to enable one tort-feasor to
settle with the injured plaintiff and allow that plaintiff to continue
the claim against other tort-feasors.3 5 The Van Cleave court de-
termined that if the Uniform Act did not apply to a claim against
the employer, "we would be discouraging prompt resolutions of ac-
tions, not encouraging such settlements, in contravention of the-ex-
pressed public policy of the Uniform Act."13 Additionally, one
commentator points out that the important policy considerations
involved in the release provisions of the 1955 Revised Act were in-
tended to be construed in a manner which would best promote set-
tlements. 37 Section 5 of the Uniform Act also calls for uniformity
129. Bumpass, supra note 128, at 160.
130. See Yates v. New South Pizza, Ltd., 330 N.C. 790, 805, 412 S.E.2d 666,
675 (1992). "Because New South Pizza is at best derivatively liable here, contribu-
tion is not implicated. Therefore, the common law principle that the discharge of
the servant requires the discharge of the master, rather than N.C.G.S. § 1B-4,
should control." Id.
131. Commissioners' Comment § 1(d) 12 U.L.A. 65 (1975). "The policy of the
Act is to encourage rather than discourage settlements." Id.
132. Id.
133. Commissioners' Prefatory Note (1955 Reversion) 12 U.L.A. 59 (1975).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 46-56.
135. See Van Cleave v. Gamboni Constr. Co., 101 Nev. 524, 530, 706 P.2d
845, 849 (1985). "Such a statute is enacted to prevent the harshness of the com-
mon-law rule, not to defeat the intentions of the parties and to work as a trap for
the unwary." Id.
136. Id.
137. Darrell L. West, Torts-Vicarious Liability-Covenant Not to Sue Ser-
vant or Agent as Affecting Liability of Master or Principal, 44 TENN. L. REV. 188,
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of interpretation with those states that interpret the statute.13 8
Thus, when the Yates court broadly interprets the meaning of
tort-feasor to include the vicarious liability between employer and
employee, the holding maintains the stated policy of the encour-
agement of settlements." 9
D. Indemnity
The Yates majority rejects the rationale that because a right
of indemnity remains against the servant, the servant gains noth-
ing by his settlement and the policy of the Uniform Act is under-
mined. 4" The dissent maintains that "the rights of contribution
and indemnity are mutually inconsistent; the former assumes joint
fault, the latter only derivative fault.' ' 4 1 Additionally, the dissent
points out that the distinction between contribution and indem-
nity is preserved in the Act."
Section 6 of the 1939 Uniform Act only contained the first
sentence of the current indemnity section."3 The 1955 Act added
the second sentence to clear up the uncertainty of whether there
could be contribution in any indemnity situation."'
In formulating their position, the dissent relies in part on the
rationale of Craven v. Lawson.' 45 The Craven court stated that the
change in the indemnity section of the 1955 Uniform Act showed a
197 (1976).
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-5 (1983). "This Article shall be so interpreted and
construed as to-effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those
states that enact it." Id.
139. Yates, 330 N.C. at 795, 412 S.E.2d at 670.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 804, 412 S.E.2d at 675.
142. Id. at 804-05, 412 S.E.2d at 670. The applicable section reads as follows:
(f) This Article does not impair any right of indemnity under ex-
isting law. Where one tort-feasor is entitled to indemnity from another,
the right of the indemnity obligee is for indemnity and not contribution,
and the indemnity obligor is not entitled to contribution from the obligee
for any portion of his indemnity obligation.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-1(f) (1983).
143. Commissioners' Comment § 1(f) 12 U.L.A. 66 (1975).
144. Commissioners' Comment § 1(f) 12 U.L.A. 66 (1975). "Where a master is
vicariously liable for the tort of his servant, the servant has no possible claim to
contribution from the master; and the master does not need contribution from the
servant and will not seek it, since he is entitled to full indemnity." Id.
145.. 534 S.W.2d 653 (Tenn. 1976).
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clear intent to exclude situations where indemnity would apply."4 6
The court held that where no right of contribution exists, the Uni-
form Act does not apply. 47 Therefore, the Craven court applied
common law and reasoned that any covenant not to sue given to an
employee would release the derivative liability of the employer. 48
Similarly, the view propounded in the Yates dissent would hold
that the Act does not apply to the derivative liability of the em-
ployer. '49 The dissent retains the common law principle that the
discharge of the servant requires the discharge of the master. 5 '
Nevertheless, the indemnity provision of the Uniform Act can
be seen as merely defining the rights among tort-feasors without
referring to the rights between the injured plaintiff and the tort-
feasors.' 5 ' The indemnity provisions of the 1955 Uniform Act
merely clarify the nature of the rights of the various tort-feasors
among themselves. 152 Furthermore, the view of the Van Cleave
court rejects the Craven court's reliance on the indemnity language
to exclude applying the Uniform Act to vicarious liability. 153 The
Van Cleave court reasons that the rights of indemnity and contri-
bution have nothing to do with the rights of the injured party. 54
Additionally, as the North Carolina Supreme Court has previously
pointed out, there is no fundamental distinction between the right
of contribution and the right of indemnity as both rights are based
on principles of equity and natural justice.' 55 "Neither right is
based on any theory of subrogation to the rights of the injured
person."'15
146. Id. at 656. "Where the right of full indemnity exists between persons
liable in tort, no right of contribution exists." Id. "[T]he 1955 Act makes it clear
that where the right of indemnity exists the act has no application." Id. at 657.
147. Id. at 657.
148. Id. at 654.
149. Yates, 330 N.C. at 807, 412 S.E.2d at 676.
150. Id. See also Smith v. South & W. R.R. Co., 151 N.C. 479, 66 S.E. 435
(1909).
151. Linda F. Rigsby, The Covenant Not to Sue: Virginia's Effort to Bury
the Common Law Rule Regarding the Release of Joint Tortfeasors, 14 U. RICH. L.
REV. 809, 833 (1980).
152. West, supra note 137, at 199.
153. Van Cleave v. Gamboni Constr. Co., 101 Nev. 524, 529, 706 P.2d 845,
848 (1985).
154. Id. at 528, 706 P.2d at 848.
155. Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 570, 75
S.E.2d 768, 776 (1953).
156. Id.
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Thus, the Yates majority is among the better reasoned opin-
ions that find nothing in the indemnity provision to preclude the
application of the Act to vicarious liability situations. 157 The Court
agrees with the Van Cleave court in holding that the indemnity
provision merely provides that no contribution exists where indem-
nity exists.15 8 In addition, the inclusion of the second sentence of
the 1955 revision of the Uniform Act reflects the concern with clar-
ifying the position that the servant has no right of contribution
against the master. 159
E. The Act Encourages Settlement
The final determination concerns the effect the Yates ruling
will have on the stated purposes of the Uniform Act to prevent the
harshness of the common law rule and to encourage settlements."'0
The Yates dissent maintains that the indemnity provision will
lessen the incentive for settlement.1 ' This argument advances the
notion that even if a servant and the injured plaintiff enter into a
covenant not to sue, the servant remains liable to the employer as
an indemnitor. 16' One commentator speculated that one effect of
the Craven decision would have been that the servant or agent
would refuse to settle because he would not be relieved of the risk
of further litigation and liability."6 3 The master or principal might
be lax in defending the suit knowing he can recover any damages
assessed against him by way of indemnity from the servant or
agent."6 4 This line of argument is unconvincing because the servant
often lacks the resources to indemnify the master. 65 Thus, in all
likelihood, a servant would not, out of fear of the possibility of in-
demnification, forgo a settlement agreement with the injured
plaintiff. 166
157. See Yates, 330 N.C. at 795, 412 S.E.2d at 670.
158. Id.
159. Commissioners' Comment § 1(f) 12 U.L.A. 66 (1975).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 64-71.
161. Yates, 330 N.C. at 806, 412 S.E.2d at 676.
162. Id.
163. West, supra note 137, at 198.
164. Id.
165. Because the employee is a Domino's Pizza delivery person the court
probably inferred he lacks any financial resources. See Yates, 330 N.C. at 791, 412
S.E.2d at 667.
166. The employee settled for the full amount allowed under his automobile
insurance policy. Id.
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The better policy argument realizes that the harsh conse-
quences of the common law rule will discourage settlements be-
cause the injured party is the one who will not enter into settle-
ment. 67 If the settlement entered into with the servant will
extinguish his cause of action against the master the injured party
will not settle unless he can be fully compensated. 16 8 The release
provision of the Uniform Act is intended to promote settle-
ments."6 9 A construction of the statute should prevent the harsh-
ness of the common law rule.17 Thus, section 1B-4 of the Act is
intended to prevent an injured party from unwittingly releasing his
claim against all tort-feasors.17 1
The Yates majority points out that the servant's settlement
was for the entire amount of his insurance coverage.' The Court
speculates that a master may choose not to seek indemnity from a
servant who in many cases may be judgment proof. 7 ' This line of
reasoning is convincing because, before the employee is liable for
indemnity, the injured plaintiff must first proceed against the em-
ployer. 74 Once the injured plaintiff gets a judgment, a separate ac-
tion for indemnity may not be commenced until after payment is
made on the judgment." 5 Then, to expand upon the courts specu-
lation, when the employer knows the employee is incapable of in-
demnification, he will be better off to seek a settlement instead of
any added expense of litigation. 76 The employer is encouraged to
settle and the injured plaintiff is fully compensated. 77 Thus, as the
majority states, the servant's settlement with the injured party ful-
167. Van Cleave V. Gamboni Constr. Co., 101 Nev. 524, , 706 P.2d 845, 849
(1985). "If we determine that the Uniform Act does not apply to [the] claim
against the employer, we would be discouraging prompt resolutions of action, not
encouraging such settlements, in contravention of the expressed public policy of
the Uniform Act." Id.
168. West, supra note 138, at 198.
169. supra note 132.
170. supra, text accompanying note 134.
171. Bumpass, supra note 129, at 174.
172. Yates, 330 N.C. at 795, 412 S.E.2d at 670.
173. Id.
174. See Ingram v. Smith, 16 N.C. App. 147, 152, 191 S.E.2d 390, 394 (1972)
cert. denied, 282 N.C. 304, 192 S.E.2d 195 (1972) (there is no right to sue for
indemnity until after a judgment is paid or satisfied by settlement). Id.
175. Id.
176. See Yates, 330 N.C. at 795, 412 S.E.2d at 670.
177. Id.
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fills the underlying policy of the Act."7 8
Finally, the specific facts of Yates demonstrate how the public
policy is fulfilled in applying the Uniform Act to the master-ser-
vant relationship.17 9 The injured plaintiff seeks relief for his inju-
ries, and, as in this case, these injuries are often permanent.180 The
injured plaintiff is seeking monetary compensation for these inju-
ries.' 81 In equity, the doctrine of respondeat superior seeks to com-
pensate an innocent injured plaintiff. 8 ' Yet, this is not accom-
plished by forcing those injured to take the risk of running afoul of
the harsh, technical common law rules.1 83 The policy behind the
doctrine of respondeat superior makes the master liable primarily
because the servant lacks financial resources.' 84 Without the Yates
rule applying the release provision of the Act to the master-servant
relationship, the injured plaintiff will remain at risk of inadver-
tently releasing all claims against the master.'85 Thus, the North
Carolina Supreme Court's application of section 1B-4 of the Act to
master-servant liability supports the equitable doctrine of respon-
deat superior, and will quickly get the sought after monetary com-
pensation to the injured plaintiff.' 88
CONCLUSION
In Yates v. New South Pizza, Ltd., the North Carolina Court
asserts its place among those courts whose sound reasoning have
made the determination to apply Section 4 of the Uniform Contri-
bution Among Tort-feasor Act to the master-servant relationship.
The Yates rule applies when an injured plaintiff settles with the
employee specifically reserving the right to sue the employer. The
vicariously liable employer is a tort-feasor as that term is applied
to the Act. The new rule in North Carolina will enable injured
plaintiffs to gain partial compensation more quickly than by wait-
ing to obtain a final judgment through the judicial process. The
injured plaintiff is at less risk. of inadvertently falling into the trap
178. Id.
179. See id. at 791, 412 S.E.2d at 667.
180. Id.
-181. Id.
182. See supra note 29.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 46-56.
184. Supra note 27.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
186. In Yates, the injured plaintiff initially received $25,000 from the settle-
ment with the employee. Yates, 330 N.C. at 791, 412 S.E.2d at 667.
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of harsh common law rules. The injured plaintiff may settle with
an employee and then proceed against the employer. The employee
often has limited resources, or as in this case, will settle for the full
coverage amount of his insurance. The employer can still settle,
with the injured plaintiff. In addition, the employer is still entitled
to indemnity from the employee. However, as in this case, the em-
ployer would probably not -be indemnified to any significant
amount and therefore has an incentive to settle with the injured
plaintiff once the servant has settled.
J. Elizabeth Spradlin
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